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Much of the developing world has experienced a 
decline in mortality, while fertility often has remained 
high. This has produced youthful populations in many 
countries, generally referred to as “youth bulges.” Recent 
empirical research suggests that youth bulges may be 
associated with increased risks of political violence 
and conflict. This paper addresses ways that education 
may serve as a strategy to reduce the risk of political 
violence, particularly in the context of large cohorts 
of young males. The authors use a new education 
dataset measuring educational attainment. The dataset 
is constructed using demographic back-projection 
techniques, and offers uninterrupted time-series data 
for 120 countries. The empirical analysis finds evidence 
that large, young male population bulges are more 
likely to increase the risk of conflict in societies where 
This paper—a product of the Post Conflict & Social Development Unit, Africa Region, with support from the Trust Fund 
for Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs—is part of a 
larger effort to build a solid body of theoretical and applied research on the links between youth exclusion and political 
violence. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be 
contacted at Bilal.Barakat@oeaw.ac.at and henriku@prio.no.
male secondary education is low. The effect on conflict 
risk by low education and large youth populations is 
particularly strong in low and middle-income countries. 
This is especially challenging for Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
region facing the youngest age structure and the lowest 
educational attainment levels. Although quantitative 
studies generally find a strong relationship between 
indicators of development and conflict risk, the results 
suggest that poor countries do have some leverage over 
reducing conflict potential through increased educational 
opportunities for young people. There is further evidence 
that the interaction of large youth cohorts and low 
education levels may be mediated by structural economic 
factors. The study supports broad policy interventions in 
education by relaxing concerns about the consequences of 
rapid educational expansion.  
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1.0 Introduction 
Recent quantitative studies have found that large youth cohorts, or ‘youth bulges’ generally increase the risk of 
internal armed conflict or civil war (Cincotta et al, 2003; Staveteig 2004; Urdal 2006; 2008). Explanations for this 
relationship have been sought in the environmental conditions determining economic, social and political 
opportunities for young people. While young men are undoubtedly the main protagonists of political, as well as 
criminal, violence, the vast majority of young men do not engage in violent conflict. Nor are countries with very 
youthful age structures necessarily predestined to experience instability and conflict. In fact, given the right 
conditions, large youth cohorts may represent a significant resource that can boost development, a so-called 
‘demographic dividend’. Recent studies in economic demography suggest that countries are better positioned to 
achieve economic progress if large youth cohorts precede significantly smaller cohorts (Birdsall et al., 2001).  
While large youth cohorts may generally increase the risk of conflict, the contextual factors that determine 
when this is true, and under what conditions large youth cohorts may be a blessing, are not well understood. More 
generally, the realization of the demographic dividend ‘depends upon other features of the social, economic, and 
political environment’ (Williamson, 2001: 108). The conflict potential of large youth cohorts has been linked to the 
opportunity structure of youth cohorts determined by factors like economic growth, the structure of the economy, 
unemployment and educational attainment. Addressing the size of the cohorts merely captures limited aspects of the 
opportunity structure, hence the challenge lies in identifying how environmental factors may systematically 
influence the youth bulge and conflict nexus. 
This article analyzes the potential mediating role of educational attainment and education reform on the 
relationship between youth bulges and conflict. Our ambition is to test prevailing hypotheses on the relationship 
between youth bulges, education and different forms of political violence in a global model for the 1970-2000 
period. Greater levels of educational attainment are generally perceived as a positive factor, increasing the 
opportunity cost of young people and hence reducing the likelihood that they are recruited to rebel organizations. 
Indeed, large public investment in basic education is seen as an important success factor behind the realization of the 
demographic dividend in East Asian countries such as South Korea and Taiwan, while countries in Latin America 
have, among other things, invested less in education, and largely failed to take advantage of rapid demographic 
change (Birdsall & Sinding, 2001: 11).  
However, certain forms of pressures in the educational system have been argued to potentially increase 
frustrations and anger among youth. Specifically, we address claims that conflict may arise due to unmet 
expectations in the form of low progression ratios between different education levels, as well as following rapid 
expansions in secondary and tertiary education presumably producing an over-capacity of highly educated youth for 
which there are limited employment opportunities. 
Expanding access to education is a tool that countries may use in order to respond to large youth cohorts. 
Since, relative to most other factors that are known to affect the risk of civil war (Hegre & Sambanis, 2006), 
expanding education is a feasible policy-option for most governments, the study of the role of education is 
particularly pertinent (Thyne, 2006). But as Mack (2002) points out, policy-makers may not take a great interest in 
general recommendations of policies that are already widely pursued as a broader development agenda, even though Breaking the Waves? Education, Youth Bulges, and Armed Conflict 
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invoking security arguments is often helpful for rallying support behind a specific policy. Rather, identifying more 
specifically what forms of education and under what conditions educational reform may help break the general 
adverse relationship between youth bulges and political violence can form the basis for developing better policy 
instruments for engaging youth in development rather than violence.  
The issue of age structure aside, the interaction of schooling and national conflict has attracted increasing 
interest from educational researchers for at least a decade. Initially attention focused primarily on the detrimental 
effects of violent conflict on educational development, Education for All (EFA) and educational MDGs (c.f. Machel, 
1996; Bensalah et al., 2000). More recently, the ways in which inequitable schooling and discriminatory curricula 
can actively contribute to violence have been exposed, leading to the notion of ‘the two faces of education in 
conflict’ (Bush & Saltarelli, 2000; Davies, 2004). Tomlinson & Benefield (2005) provide a recent review of the 
field. To date, most of this research has been qualitative, reflecting the fact that the research agenda has been driven 
by the concerns of practitioners and researchers ‘in the field’, a lack of comparable international data, and the 
complexity of the interaction.  
Despite the different nature and emphasis of the present study, the body of research on ‘education and 
conflict’ offers a warning important to any attempt to study the effect of schooling ‘outcomes’ (attainment levels) on 
violent conflict, namely that the educational process and content have been shown to matter. Much variability is to 
be expected in the effect of high participation in secondary schooling, since ‘secondary schooling’ can, depending 
on context, mean either exposure to incitement and a culture and logic of violence, as an examination of textbooks in 
Afghanistan (Spink, 2005) or pre-genocide Rwanda (Obura, 2003) show, or to civics and peace education.  
We are using a newly constructed dataset measuring cohort-specific educational attainment rates. The 
dataset, developed by researchers at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), contains time-
series data from 1970-2000 for 120 countries. Based on age-specific education data from national censuses and 
Demographic Health Surveys (DHS), the project has performed demographic back-projections to arrive at the most 
consistent and complete education dataset available, representing a vast improvement over existing education 
datasets that primarily measure educational enrollment. Since it is primarily young men who are the perpetrators of 
violence, this paper focuses on educational attainment for young men, as well as the size of young male cohorts. 
Armed conflict refers to low-intensity internal conflict as defined by the Uppsala/PRIO dataset (Gleditsch et al. 
2002). We are also employing two different age composition measures, a procedure aimed at discriminating between 
rival explanations in the youth bulge literature. The Relative Youth Cohort Size (RYCS) measure is more sensitive 
to reduced employment opportunities arising from a rapid increase in the size of youth cohorts relative to the 
immediate preceding cohorts (Easterlin, 1987; Korenman & Neumark, 1997; Machunovich, 2000), while the 
conventional youth bulge measure captures the overall abundance or density of youth in the adult population 
determining the relative availability of potential rebel soldiers with generally low opportunity cost. We specifically 
address the role age structure and education in Sub-Saharan Africa. Exploring whether expanding education in Sub-
Saharan Africa may contribute to curb conflict in one of the poorest and least stable regions of the world has 
important policy implications. 
 Breaking the Waves? Education, Youth Bulges, and Armed Conflict 
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2.0 Youth, education and conflict 
Youth bulges have been argued to provide both opportunities and motives for political violence. Collier (2000: 94) 
has suggested that relatively large youth cohorts may be a factor that reduces recruitment costs through the abundant 
supply of rebel labor with low opportunity cost, increasing the risk of armed conflict. According to the opportunity 
perspective, rebellion is feasible only when the potential gain from joining is so high and the expected costs so low 
that rebel recruits will favor joining over alternative income-earning opportunities. Studies in economic demography 
also suggest that large cohorts are likely to experience a pressure on wages, so that the opportunity cost of a person 
belonging to a large cohort is on average lower than that of a person belonging to a smaller cohort (Easterlin, 1987; 
Machunovich, 2000). 
Another strain of literature focuses on how youth bulges provide motives for political violence. Frustration 
and aggression among youth populations arise as a result of pressures in educational institutions or the labor market 
(Moller, 1968; Choucri, 1974; Braungart, 1984; Huntington 1996; Goldstone, 1991; 2001; Cincotta et al., 2003). 
Youth unemployment is generally higher among younger than older cohorts, and in some countries youth 
unemployment is particularly high among educated youths (e.g. McNally et al., 2004: 162; Kabbani & Kothari, 
2005). In the following, we discuss how education may relate to these two perspectives, and address youth and 
education in relation to relevant determinants of conflict motives and opportunities. 
 
2.1 Education as a Factor that Increases Opportunity Cost 
Opportunity factors in armed conflict relate to structural conditions that facilitate a rebel group’s war against a 
government. These may either be conditions that provide the rebel group with extraordinary financial means to fight, 
or factors that reduce the cost of rebellion, such as unusually low recruitment costs for rebel soldiers. The 
availability of large youth cohorts may be a factor that reduces recruitment costs through the abundant supply of 
rebel labor with low opportunity cost (Collier, 2000). Rebel recruits join to obtain a private good, weighing the 
potential gains against the expected costs represented by the risk of being killed or maimed. Relative gains are high 
either when outside options are poor, or when a rebel group can offer greater rewards through loot-seeking activities 
(Gates, 2002: 116).  
Education is generally expected to increase the opportunity cost of rebel labor, since an educated person on 
average is expected to have greater income-earning opportunities, although for the relatively small number of 
‘conflict entrepreneurs’, a higher level of education may in fact lead to higher rewards on account of more efficient 
management of illicit trade or similar activities. However, the present study is concerned with structural conditions, 
and the argument that rebel activity is economically less attractive to more highly educated youth refers to mass 
participation as fighters. 
 This implies that rebel recruitment is more costly and rebellion less likely the higher the level of education 
in a society (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004), everything else being equal. In countries with large potential pools of 
recruits, increasing educational attainment at any level can act to reduce this pool, and we should expect to see that 
youth bulges primarily are associated with an elevated risk of conflict in low-education societies. Furthermore, we 
expect that structural economic conditions affect the relative opportunity cost of a young educated person. More Breaking the Waves? Education, Youth Bulges, and Armed Conflict 
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specifically we hypothesize that the income-earning opportunities for educated youth are greater in societies where 
economic opportunities are good, assuming that among low and middle income countries, large youth cohorts and 
low educational attainment rates are relevant for explaining the onset of violent conflict.  In particular, we expect 
this to be true for sub-Saharan Africa, a region that generally sees large youth populations and low investments in 
education, and also generally offers fewer economic opportunities for youth. Studying the social, economic and 
political determinants for the positive engagement of African youth into development has obvious policy 
implications. 
Although the argument that education increases the opportunity cost of youth takes a general form, we 
focus here on secondary education for young males since they are the primary target for recruitment and because 
gender disparities in education are widely observed. 
 
H1: Countries that invest less in secondary education for young men are more likely to experience armed 
conflict in the context of large youth bulges. 
 
H2: Large cohorts of young men with low secondary education levels increase the risk of conflict more in 
low and middle income countries, and in particular in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
We further assess the claim by Weinstein (2005) that a rebel group’s resource profile determines the socio-
demographic make-up of the rebel organization. Rebel organizations that have access to rich natural resources are 
able to quickly overcome the collective action problem and build a substantial army by offering private economic 
rewards to new recruits. Rebel groups that do not possess considerable economic endowments instead have to draw 
on social endowments ‘including shared beliefs, common expectations, norms of behavior, and trust with certain 
members of the population’ (ibid. p. 601). While the recruitment processes of such rebel organizations are more 
incremental, the quality of recruits is generally greater since recruits have to be highly committed to accept that 
rewards are long-term. Low-commitment recruits, on the other hand, are likely to join only if immediate and 
significant rewards are credibly offered. Weinstein argues that this represents a rebel ‘resource curse’, where access 
to rich resources tends to flood rebel organizations with opportunistic joiners (ibid. p, 599). He observes that both in 
Mozambique (Renamo) and in Sierra Leone (RUF), where the economic endowments were considerable, rebel 
organizations consisted mainly of poorly educated individuals. In Mozambique less than three percent of the soldiers 
had an education at the high school level and above (ibid.: 613). This is contrasted with the National Resistance 
Army (NRA) in Uganda and the EPLF in Eritrea, both of which had to rely on social endowments, resulting in 
organizations with a very different educational structure than those of Renamo and RUF (Weinstein, 2005). 
Similarly, Oyefusi (2008) found that low educational attainment significantly increased the willingness of young 
people to participate in armed struggle for local resource control in the oil-rich Niger Delta, Nigeria, despite lower 
levels of grievances among low educated than among better educated youth. Building on these observations we posit 
that the availability of large and uneducated youth cohorts may be a factor that particularly increases the risk of 
conflict in countries that possess rich natural resources.  Breaking the Waves? Education, Youth Bulges, and Armed Conflict 
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H3: The presence of large youth cohorts with low education increases the risk of conflict more the higher 
the country’s dependence on rich natural resources. 
 
2.2 Education as a Factor that Produces Frustration and Aggression  
Relative deprivation theory posits that grievances and frustration arise when the gap between people’s expectations 
and their actual situation widens (Gurr, 1970). Political violence is seen as a means to redress these grievances 
(Sambanis, 2002). Although we here treat low education as an opportunity factor, the argument could also be made 
that a lack of spending on education generally signals low governmental responsiveness vis-à-vis the population, 
and may produce grievances among segments of the population barred from the educational system (e.g. Thyne, 
2006). This interpretation is plausible, and we are not able in the current empirical assessment to distinguish 
between low education as an opportunity or a motivation factor. In the following, we focus on two factors that 
arguably more clearly capture grievance, rather than opportunity, aspects: unmet expectations of educational 
progression, and expansions in education leading to an over-supply of educated youth.  
The provision of near universal lower education is assumed to greatly increase expectations of further 
educational opportunities among young people, and the failure to provide such may increase anti-government 
grievances. In many countries it has been an explicit focus on first providing primary education to all, giving less 
priority to providing secondary and higher education. An example from our sample is Namibia, where primary 
attainment levels among 15-19 year-old men in 2000 were 100%, while only 24 percent of young men aged 20-24 
had received secondary or higher education. In Tanzania, the corresponding numbers were roughly 80% primary and 
10% secondary male attainment (see Appendix B through E for attainment levels in Sub Sahara Africa). Thyne 
(2006) argues that primary enrollment rates capture government responsiveness towards the population. We hold 
that low educational progression ratios, meaning low opportunities for advancing from one level of educational 
attainment to the next, may be a better indicator of low government responsiveness and more strongly associated 
with greater risks of conflict.  
Second, increasing education leads to increasing expectations of getting employment, and grievances may 
arise if economic opportunities for educated youth are severely limited compared to the supply. It has been argued 
that high unemployment among educated youth is one of the most destabilizing and potentially violent socio-
political phenomena in any regime (Choucri 1974: 73), and Goldstone notes that rapid increases in the number of 
educated youth historically have been associated with political upheaval. Lia (2005: 145-146) argues that the 
expansion of higher education in many countries in the Middle East, producing larger classes of educated youth than 
the labor market can absorb, has had a radicalizing effect and provided new recruits to militant organizations in the 
area. Unless there are economic opportunities either in the private sector or through government programs, 
prevailing unemployment among highly educated youth segments may cause frustrations that could motivate 
political violence. Although we are unable to measure economic opportunities directly, we assume that labor 
markets generally are not sufficiently flexible to accommodate rapid increases in the number of highly qualified Breaking the Waves? Education, Youth Bulges, and Armed Conflict 
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youth. Hence, an important policy question is whether countries are best advised to expand educational opportunities 
gradually in order to avoid increased grievances and instability.   
 
H4: The lower the educational progression ratios from primary to secondary, the greater the risk of armed 
conflict. 
 
H5: Rapid expansions in educational attainment (secondary/tertiary) increase the risk of armed conflict. 
 
3.0 Empirical model and data 
The analysis is based on a dataset combined from a number of sources and expanded through the calculation of 
additional derived variables. The dataset covers 120 countries for the 1970-2000 period, as well as four historical 
entities. The spatial-temporal domain is determined by the coverage of the education dataset used (Lutz et al., 2007; 
see Appendix A).  
Data on the dependent variable, domestic armed conflict onset, is drawn from the Uppsala/PRIO dataset 
(Gleditsch et al., 2002). The Uppsala/PRIO dataset sets a relatively low violence threshold for conflict, and 
distinguishes between minor armed conflict (a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths per year), and war (at least 1,000 
battle-related deaths per year). Several conflicts in the dataset are inactive for periods before they restart, posing the 
issue of how to code recurring conflicts. The dependent variable used for this study requires at least two years of 
inactivity before a new onset is coded.
2 Similarly, conflicts beginning while another conflict in the country is already 
in progress are excluded. In other words, only transitions from a spell of peace to a state of conflict are analyzed. 
There are a total of 79 conflict onsets among the countries covered by the IIASA dataset during the 1970-2000 
period.
3  
We have used two measures for young male bulges, the conventional measure of 15-24 year old males as 
share of all males aged 15 and above, and a measure that better captures the dynamics in the younger working-age 
segments measured as the ratio between 15-29 year-olds and 30-44 year-olds, the Relative Youth Cohort Size 
(RYCS). Both measures are constructed on the basis of the age structure data provided in the education dataset (Lutz 
et al., 2007), which is consistent with the UN Population Division’s World Population Prospects: The 2004 
Revision. As described above, the RYCS measure should be more sensitive to reduced employment opportunities 
due to increasing relative cohort size, while the conventional measure more generally captures the abundance of 
youth in the adult population. Both of these measures were centered on their means. 
 
                                                           
2 In a previous study (Urdal, 2006), alternative coding rules were applied by changing the requirement to one year and five year 
of inactivity, with only marginal impacts on the main results. 
3 The corresponding number of conflict onsets for all countries for the same period is 125. Breaking the Waves? Education, Youth Bulges, and Armed Conflict 
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3.1 IIASA Human Capital Data 
Education data originate from a new dataset compiled by researchers at IIASA (Lutz et al. 2007). The dataset 
contains information from 120 countries for the 1970-2000 period, based on individual-level educational attainment 
data from Demographic Health Surveys and national censuses, back projected using multi-state demographic 
modeling. The dataset measures educational attainment as opposed to more commonly used education measures like 
educational spending or enrollment rates. It covers a great number of developing countries, including many 
countries with recent conflict experiences.  
The IIASA data consists of population estimates by age, gender and highest educational attainment (4 
categories: no schooling, some primary, completed lower secondary, completed tertiary), covering the period from 
1970 to 2000, for 120 countries/territories (discrepancies between this figure and others below arise from the fact 
that more countries have been added since the publication of Lutz et al. (2007) and the introduction of splits and 
mergers during data matching). It is discussed in some detail here because of the novel methodology it is based on 
and the implications this has for the present analysis. 
The dataset corrects a number of deficiencies of existing education statistics for this period that have to this 
date prevented the kind of analysis conducted in this study. The principal existing source for historical international 
education statistics has been UNESCO, which has been collating national education statistics since the 1960s. 
Unfortunately, this database suffers from at least four problems. Firstly, there are many gaps, reflecting years in 
which no statistics were provided by particular countries. Secondly, not all countries had the capacity to collect 
reliable data, especially in earlier years. Thirdly, the statistics are not fully consistent across countries due to 
different definitions. Fourthly they are not consistent over time, as definitions, incl. internationally agreed ones, such 
as the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) categories, were modified at various points in 
time. 
The IIASA dataset attempts to overcome these limitations by employing a novel methodology inspired by 
demographic methods to reconstruct historic attainment data from censuses performed around the year 2000. The 
central idea is that at any point in time, the education profile of the population reflects its educational history much 
like its age profile reflects past fertility and mortality. Since the highest education level is typically reached 
relatively early in life, it can be assumed that the 50-year olds with secondary education in 2000 come from exactly 
one population group in 1995, namely the 45-year olds with secondary education, rather than a mixture of these and 
45-year olds in 1995 who graduated from secondary school between 1995 and 2000. This principle is refined by 
applying differential mortality rates to different educational attainment groups, by disaggregating the oldest age 
group and normalizing the figures to the known total population size known for any intermediate years. For a more 
detailed reference, see (Lutz et al., 2007). 
The dataset produced by this method is by design complete in the sense that every combination of country 
and year within its scope contains a data entry; it can be considered more reliable in that data from recent census 
results can be assumed to be of higher quality than data collected twenty or thirty years ago, when many developing 
countries had lower statistical capacity; it is consistent across countries in that the census categories are mapped to 
the ISCED classification in creating the baseline data; and it is consistent over time in that the entire dataset is with Breaking the Waves? Education, Youth Bulges, and Armed Conflict 
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reference to the definitions valid in 2000, regardless of different conventions at the time. 
On the other hand, the IIASA dataset comes with limitations of its own. A significant number of countries 
is not included, and – especially relevant to the present study – since it is difficult or impossible to conduct an 
effective census in unstable countries, exclusion from the list is likely to correlate with the occurrence of conflict. 
Another limitation lies in the necessity to make more or less well-justified assumptions regarding firstly the 
education profile of migrants, and secondly the age at which educational transitions occur. While the transition to 
primary education can be assumed to occur before the age of 15 for the vast majority of those who do make it, the 
proportion of lower secondary completions occurring before and after the age of 15 must be estimated. The range of 
ages of transition to tertiary education is even greater, especially in many developing countries.  
While these assumptions regarding the exact age of transition may not be critical when analyzing the effect 
of the education profile of the entire labor force on economic growth, say, an analysis dealing with youth, i.e. 
focusing on the ages at which the transitions tend to occur, is more sensitive to them. An additional complication lies 
in the definition of the education levels. Mapping all possible educational attainment levels to 4 categories 
necessarily means some distinctions are blurred. The mapping in the IIASA data means that all those with any 
primary schooling but who never completed lower secondary school fall into level 2. As a result, individuals can be 
registered as being at level 2 even if they only attended primary school for a year, and are for all practical purposes 
(and for the purposes of the present analysis) indistinguishable from the lowest attainment level. 
To mitigate the impact of the above, the present study focuses primarily on the effect of secondary 
schooling. This means it is unaffected by the blurring between the bottom two levels and by the problematic 
assumptions regarding the age of tertiary completion. The principle education variable analyzed is the proportion of 
20-24 year-old males in the two higher attainment categories, i.e. having at least completed lower secondary school. 
Even though the values for males and females are highly correlated (Pearson's correlation coefficient > 0.95), the 
value for males is chosen on account of  reflecting more closely the theoretical considerations that it is specifically 
young men who contribute to conflict potential. This indicator is robust to the exact timing of the transition from 
‘some primary’ to ‘completed lower secondary’, because all of these are assumed to have occurred by age 20.  
We have constructed additional education variables to test more specific claims in the youth bulge and 
conflict literature. Progression ratios from primary to secondary education are defined as the percentage of males 
aged 15-19 with secondary or higher education of all males aged 15-19 with primary or higher education. Similarly, 
progression ratios from secondary to tertiary education are defined as the percentage of males aged 24-29 with 
tertiary education as a share of all males aged 24-29 with secondary or higher education. Expansion in secondary 
education among males aged 15-24 is defined as the number of males with secondary education aged 15-24 at time t 
less the number in the same category in period t-1, normalized over the total male population aged 15-24 at time t. 
Similarly, expansion in tertiary education among males aged 20-29 is defined as the number of males with tertiary 
education aged 20-29 at time t less the number in the same category in period t-1, normalized over the total male 
population aged 20-29 at time t. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate trends in primary and secondary male educational 
attainment respectively, globally for Sub-Saharan Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa is trailing well below the rest of the 
world in secondary educational attainment, although there is considerable inter-regional and cross-country variation Breaking the Waves? Education, Youth Bulges, and Armed Conflict 
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3.2 Control variables 
Level of development is interchangeably proxied by infant mortality rate (IMR) collected from the World Population 
Prospects (UN, 1999) and a logtransformed measurement for PPP adjusted GDP per capita collected from the Penn 
World Tables (Heston et al., 2002). The Polity IV data (Marshall & Jaggers, 2000) are used to measure regime type, 
and the variable ranges from -10 (most autocratic) to 10 (most democratic). Total population size is drawn from the 
World Population Prospects (UN, 1999) and is log-transformed.  
 
3.3 Combined dataset and model 
The above datasets were matched by country and year. In order to do so, the IIASA data, which covers 5-year 
intervals, was expanded by creating records for the intermediate years. This was done by applying the data for year x 
to years x-2 through x+2 (e.g. the value for 1975 was assigned to the years 1973 through 1977). As a result, the 
education variables as well as the age structure variables change step-wise every five years. This approach was 
chosen over interpolation for reasons of simplicity and because there was no compelling theoretical argument for 
any particular form of interpolation curve. 
The combined dataset covers 124 countries/territories for the years 1970-2000.
4 The key variables used in 
the analysis are: onset of conflict, years since last conflict, infant mortality rate (IMR), Polity index, dependency 
ratio, (natural logarithm of) total population, age composition, % of males aged 20-24 years with secondary 
schooling or higher. Among these variables, the number of missing values is 312 out of a total number of 3,434 
observations. All are missing due to lack of information on the Polity index, and for the purpose of this analysis 
missing values on Polity are set to the sample average (‘0’) adding a dummy variable controlling for imputed values. 
The analysis takes the form of a logistic regression, with the onset of an armed internal conflict (defined 
above) as the dependent variable. All subsequent observations of the same conflict are omitted and we also apply a 
control variable for time in peace, counting the number of years in peace since the previous conflict. The variable 
counts time in peace going all the way back to 1945 which is the first year covered by the PRIO/Uppsala conflict 
data.  
The inclusion of a variable measuring the duration in years of the current spell of peace means this 
approach can be interpreted as a survival analysis (c.f. Singer and Willett, 2003; see Beck et al., 1998 and Raknerud 
& Hegre, 1997 for applications in the study of armed conflict). While data points within the same peace spell are not 
originally independent, they are conditionally independent given the inclusion of the 'time since last conflict' 
variable. Statistical dependence across multiple peace spells experienced by the same country is more difficult to 
                                                           
4 The datasets differed in their handling of country partitions and unifications for the period studied, in particular the 
demographic and education data were not available for historical states. These were reconciled manually. For historical periods 
of partitioned states (e.g. the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia), education and population measures were constructed based on data from 
the successor states for which such information was available (the education dataset lacks information for several former Soviet 
as well as Former Yugoslavian Republics). For states that have unified (e.g. Germany, Yemen, Vietnam), these variables have 
been constructed by distributing age- and education-specific populations on the separate historical territories based on historical 
estimates of total population size, assuming that age structure and educational attainment levels were the same. Breaking the Waves? Education, Youth Bulges, and Armed Conflict 
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account for. Some countries experienced up to four peace spells in the period 1970-2000. Nevertheless, the number 
of multiple peace spells is small relative to the total number. In the absence of an established method to correct for 
this dependence, this problem is therefore treated as a nuisance and ignored in the analysis. Geographic interactions 
between neighboring countries (which are certainly known to exist, e.g. Gleditsch, 2007; Buhaug & Gleditsch, 
2008) and other unobserved heterogeneities cannot be accounted for either. 
The analysis was performed using the statistical systems STATA (StataCorp, 2007) and R (R Development 
Core Team, 2007), the latter in combination with a number of specialized packages.
5  
 
4.0 Analysis and results 
The core set of explanatory variables included in the models is determined firstly by standard predictors of conflict 
commonly used in the literature, and is largely identical with those in Urdal (2006). We principally use the infant 
mortality rate (IMR) as the indicator of ‘general development’ in the present analysis, a measure that is both more 
sensitive to social development beyond material living conditions, and also more sensitive to economic inequalities. 
GDP per capita is used as an alternative measure to compare results with the seminal study of education and conflict 
by Thyne (2006). Two different measures of age composition are tested. Measure 1 is the ratio of males 15-24 to the 
male adult population 15+. This is consistent with the definition previously used. Measure 2, RYCS, is the ratio of 
males 15-29 to males 30-45, in a slight variation on the measure proposed by Staveteig (2004). The rationale is that 
this last measure is easy to interpret, namely the increase in young men 15-29 relative to their number 15 years 
earlier (ignoring mortality, which at these ages is normally fairly low).  
Secondary education is found to provide the most suitable discriminator in assessing the role of education. 
Especially in later years, the proportion of the highest and lowest categories (completed tertiary and no schooling) 
are small in most countries, while the share of secondary educated youth covers the full range of possible values. 
Lastly, the measure is theoretically attractive and of particular policy importance. The transition to secondary-level 
qualification is a threshold for participation in the modern economic sector and as such is likely to mark a significant 
rise in opportunity costs for participation in violent conflict.  
In addition, the effects of secondary schooling are of practical interest for policy formulation in developing 
countries. While the aim of universal primary schooling is considered a given since the Education for All (EFA) and 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG) processes, and for many developing countries mass participation at the 
tertiary level remains in any case far off, there is genuine debate and a wide range of opinions (both within 
developing countries and international organizations) regarding the appropriate rate of expansion of secondary 
schooling (Alvarez et al., 2003). 
Finally, the use of secondary education or higher in the age group 20-24 helps reduce endogeneity and to 
disambiguate the direction of causation. Since secondary education is typically obtained at ages 15-19, its spread in 
the 20-24 age group depends on past education trends, and cannot, therefore, be directly influenced by the 
occurrence of conflict in the year of analysis, only the reverse. The possibility that an unknown third factor affects 
both education and the occurrence of conflict, but with different time lags, can of course not be excluded. 
                                                           
5 Cranmer, 2007; Imai, King & Lau, 2007; 2008a; 2008b. Breaking the Waves? Education, Youth Bulges, and Armed Conflict 
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4.1 Without education 
As a first step, the set of predictors excluding education were tested. The aim was to establish a baseline by 
verifying whether the effect found in Urdal (2006) could be replicated on this smaller subset of countries and years. 
First, all predictors were included as potentially non-linear terms in a logistic Generalized Additive Model (GAM) to 
establish whether assumptions of linearity were reasonable. With the exception of the Polity measure, all terms show 
an approximately linear effect. Accordingly, all subsequent models include these predictors as linear terms. The 
effect of the Polity term is displayed in Figure 3. It confirms previous findings and theoretical arguments (Hegre et 
al., 2001) in favor of an ‘inverted U-shaped’ effect, where transitional regimes are most prone to violent conflict. 
Both repressive totalitarian regimes and democracies are less vulnerable, albeit for different reasons. In all 
subsequent models, we have included a squared Polity term to account for this relationship. 
 
Figure 3 The effect of regime type on conflict onset 
 
 
In Table 1, the original model is replicated for the education sub-sample (Model 1), with the exception of ‘brevity of 
peace’ in this study being measured linearly in years. The effect of age structure on conflict propensity could be 
confirmed but is less strong than found previously, as could be expected given the smaller sample (124 countries x 
30 years compared to 217 countries x 50 years). Moreover, the model is somewhat sensitive to the precise age 
structure measure used. The original youth bulge measure (Measure 1, Model 1) overall performs slightly better than 
the RYCS measure (Model 2), suggesting that overall density of youth in the adult population may be more relevant 
than a sudden increase (note that Measure 1 and 2 have different scales and their coefficients are not comparable). In Breaking the Waves? Education, Youth Bulges, and Armed Conflict 
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all later models, Measure 1 is used. 
  Infant Mortality Rates used as the development measure is clearly statistically significant, while a measure 
of GDP per capita in the same model is insignificant (not shown here). Replacing the development measure with the 
secondary male educational attainment term reinstates the effect (not shown here), underscoring the high correlation 
between secondary education and other development measures.  
 
Table 1 Youth bulges, education and internal armed conflict 
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Secondary attainment, all          -1.703
** 
(-2.21) 









   







































































































***p<0.01. Robust z statistics in parentheses. 
‡ The reason for the very different parameter estimates between measures 1 and 2 is the different scales. 
 
 
4.2 With education 
In a next step, the secondary schooling measure defined above was added to the original model as an independent 
predictor (Model 3). This in itself does not improve the model fit or show a significant effect. However, the 
education variable is highly correlated with several of the other predictors, in particular the proxy for general 
development, IMR. Moreover, the aim of the study is to uncover interaction effects (especially with age structure) as 
much as direct effects of education. When running male secondary attainment in a model using GDP per capita, and 
not IMR, as development measure (Model 4), male secondary attainment is clearly statistically significant. This is 
consistent with Thyne’s (2006) findings. This underscores that there is more to ‘development’ than income or state Breaking the Waves? Education, Youth Bulges, and Armed Conflict 
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capacity. Both IMR and education seem to capture aspects of social development that have a pacifying effect.  
It is also important to note that when replacing male secondary education with secondary education for 
both sexes combined (Model 5), the latter measure is slightly more predictive than male attainment, which is the 
opposite of what Thyne (2006) found. This finding suggests at least that there does not seem to be an added effect 
on peace from giving priority to male education. Even though females with low education, as opposed to males, are 
not typically a group suspected of directly engaging in violence, raising female education is likely to have a 
mitigating effect on indirect risk factors of conflict, economic growth and social cohesion, for example. 
 
4.3 Other education relationships 
In Table 2, two additional hypothesized relationships between education and conflict are tested. Model 6 contains 
the measure for progression from primary to secondary education, which also appears to be unrelated to conflict.
6 
Finally, there is no increase in conflict risk associated with massive expansions in the number of youths with 
secondary or tertiary education (Models 7 and 8),
7 defined as the increase in the number of males with secondary or 
higher attainment aged 15-24 from period t-1 to period t as a share of all males aged 15-24 with secondary or higher 
attainment in period t. In fact, expansions in secondary education are statistically significantly associated with lower 
conflict risk. For tertiary education, the increase is calculated for the cohorts aged 20-29 years. Also expansions in 
tertiary education is negatively, although insignificantly, associated with conflict onset. This finding suggests that 
rapid expansions in education are not generally associated with greater conflict risks. Because the argument relating 
social unrest to large numbers of university students without a prospect for adequate employment has been made 
particularly with reference to the Middle East (e.g. Lia, 2005: 145-146; Winckler, 2005: 635) the tertiary expansion 
measure was tested on a sub-sample including only MENA countries. As before, however, no evidence was found 
that rapid expansion of tertiary education constitutes a risk factor for conflict. 
 
                                                           
6 Progression ratios from secondary to tertiary education are also unrelated to conflict risk. 
7 We have also experimented with lagged expansion variables, still yielding insignificant results. Breaking the Waves? Education, Youth Bulges, and Armed Conflict 
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Table 2 Youth bulges, education variables, and internal armed conflict 
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***p<0.01. Robust z statistics in parentheses. 
 
4.4 Stratifications of the sample 
There are no compelling theoretical arguments for any specific parametric shape or monotonicity of interaction 
between education and age structure effects on conflict. A multiplicative interaction terms is more difficult to justify 
under such circumstances than a discrete interaction in terms of dummy variables. In order to allow for the 
possibility of non-monotonic interaction, the sample was divided into 4 strata according to the level of the youth 
education measure. The thresholds were set at 20%, 40% and 80% of men aged 20-24 with secondary or higher 
education as a percentage of all men aged 20-24, and dummies created for each stratum. The results are shown in 
Table 3, Model 9. 
 Breaking the Waves? Education, Youth Bulges, and Armed Conflict 
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Table 3 Stratified models of youth bulges and education 















Medium                             β 
secondary education          Z 
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(1.41) 
       
Low secondary education          -0.331 
(-0.34) 
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(-1.34) 
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***p<0.01. Robust z statistics in parentheses. 
 
 
Note that because the education dummies are exhaustive, in other words, not all can be zero at once, no separate 
youth bulge parameter is required in addition to the interaction terms. One education level always applies and the 
interaction indicates the youth bulge effect within that education level. The discrete interaction result is strong and 
consistent: the lower the education level of male youth, the more strongly are large youth cohorts associated with the 
occurrence of conflict. The youth bulge effect in the two lowest education categories is also significant when these 
are combined (see Appendix E, Model 9.2). The value of stratified interaction rather than a multiplicative term of Breaking the Waves? Education, Youth Bulges, and Armed Conflict 
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the continuous education variable with the youth bulge measure becomes clear. While the pattern of interaction is 
consistent, it does not follow a proportional pattern, and would not be captured well by a multiplicative interaction 
term. 
  The question needs to be addressed whether the above interaction truly represents an effect of education per 
se, or whether education merely serves as an indicator of a country’s general level of development. In fact, it can be 
shown that an alternative general development indicator, namely IMR, does not reproduce the effect. Despite the 
fact that the infant mortality rate and our education measure have a correlation of over 0.8 in our sample, it is 
possible to disentangle the two to some extent, at least with regard to their interaction effect with youth bulges. In 
the ‘low’ and ‘very low’ education groups combined, the correlation between education and IMR drops to under 0.5. 
As a result, re-running Model 9 with IMR dummies instead of education dummies represents a stratification that is 
sufficiently different in the lower categories and that therefore measures a different effect, namely that of extremely 
high IMR rather than very low education. Doing this shows that the stratification by IMR fails to reproduce the fit of 
the stratification by education, both with regard to goodness-of-fit measures and with regard to coherence: unlike the 
education stratification model, which estimates steeper and steeper slopes of consistent sign for the youth bulge 
effect as the education level decreases, in the IMR stratification model the youth bulge effects change sign and 
magnitude erratically as one moves to higher and higher levels of IMR (c.f. Appendix E, Model 9.1). This provides 
even stronger evidence than the inclusion of IMR as a control that in Model 9, education does not simply act as a 
proxy for the level of ‘general development’. 
The interpretation of interaction parameters in logistic models (and non-linear models in general) is 
notoriously difficult. In particular, the intuitive interpretation of the interaction terms as a ‘difference of differences’ 
(or, in other words, a mixed second-order partial derivative) applies only to the log-odds-ratio, but not to the odds-
ratios, much less to the risk. For this reason it is best practice to examine the model implications for the quantities of 
interest directly, in this case risk levels. One method is to re-estimate the model many times on a set of bootstrap 
samples of the original sample, and to calculate and compare actual risk levels (not log-odds) associated with certain 
values of the predictors. The bootstrap approach offers the additional advantage of assessing the fit and robustness 
of the model, which is discussed further below. 
  Figure 4 below shows the expected conflict risk as a function of education level and youth cohort size. The 
interaction is clearly visible: the highest risk is associated with countries that have both a large proportion of youth 
and low education among them. Note that the uncertainty of the model is not evident from the graph, and will be 
discussed further below.  
 Breaking the Waves? Education, Youth Bulges, and Armed Conflict 
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Figure 4 Conflict risk as a function of education and youth bulges 
 
The reliability of the model needs to be carefully assessed. For all models, the values of the Pseudo-R-Square 
measure should be interpreted with caution. In logistic regression, both the interpretation and scale may differ from 
the traditional R-Square measure as used in Ordinary Least Squares regression. The measure indicated in Tables 1–3 
is McFadden’s
8 (see e.g. Williams, 2008). Its theoretical maximum is less than 1 and depends on the probabilistic 
properties of the ‘true’ model. It is suggested that values between 0.2 and 0.4 represent an excellent fit (McFadden, 
1979: 307). In a model of events that are relatively rare and not deterministically determined, a relatively large 
amount of residual variance will remain even under perfect information. The highest predicted risk for any 
individual country in a single year is less than 40% in our Model 9, so even if the high risk group could be identified 
with great confidence, much uncertainty would remain over which of these countries would in fact experience 
conflict. At the same time, it is clear that in policy terms, being able to disaggregate an overall risk of 2–3% into a 
low risk group and a high risk group with an elevated average risk level of 10–15%, say, would be extremely useful, 
even if this represented only a marginal decrease in statistical variance. 
  The spread of parameter estimates based on the bootstrap samples provides a good alternative indication of 
goodness-of-fit, since in a perfectly fitting model, all the estimates would be identical. The location of the estimates 
provides an indication of the strength of the effect. At the same time this approach constitutes a robustness-check: if 
the inclusion or exclusion of a particular observation has a large effect on the result, this will increase the spread in 
the simulated distribution, since the observation will sometimes be included in the bootstrap sample and sometimes 
not. With regard to such robustness to individual outliers, a leverage-Cook’s distance plot suggests that no 
individual or small set of countries has a disproportionate effect on the result. 
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  One hundred bootstrap simulations of Model 9 were performed here, and the risk ratio calculated of a 
theoretical country, ten years into a peace spell with low levels of male youth attainment at secondary level, average 
values for all other variables, and a youth share among males of about 33%, versus a similar country with 38% 
young males. The distribution of the risk ratios is shown in Figure 5 below. 
 
Figure 5 Simulated risk ratios  
  
 
This figure illustrates the remarks above: Despite the fact that substantial uncertainty remains ‘unexplained’ by the 
model, it is clear that a smaller youth bulge is very likely to be associated with a reduced level of risk (the vast 
majority of simulated risk ratios is below 1), typically more than 40% lower. Note that this is a conservative 
illustration of the effect, as a relatively small change in youth cohort size was simulated, and in a ‘low’ as opposed 
to ‘very low’ education regime. 
The interaction is robust to the inclusion of further controls, including urbanization, resource dependence, 
religious and ethnic polarization, and the share of agricultural production (see Appendix E, Model 9.3). Instead of 
including other factors as controls, as done above, it is also possible to examine how they mediate the interaction by 
running the stratified interaction model (Model 9) on different subsets.
9 
  For these stratified models, the number of education strata was reduced to two in most cases. First of all, 
for some of the subsets, the highest education category was in any case very sparsely populated. Secondly, the 
sample sizes on the subsets were significantly smaller than on the overall sample, and a smaller number of 
estimation parameters increases the robustness of the results. Where this applies, the top and bottom two categories 
were merged to form new ‘high/med’ and ‘low/very low’ groups. Also, the response curves are only shown for the 
segment with above-average youth cohort sizes. The reason is that the quadrant of low education - small youth 
cohorts is virtually empty in most of the subsets. As a result, the shape of the response surface in this quadrant is 
                                                           
9 In addition to the subsets reported here, we have run the stratified interaction model (Model 9) on the following 
subsets: pre-1991, post-1990, high agricultural dependence, and high religious and ethnic polarization. For the pre-
1991 and the high agricultural dependence subsets, the interaction effect was statistically significant at the 0.05 and 
0.1 levels respectively. For the post-1990 period, the interaction between large youth bulges and medium to high 
education is actually negative and significant at the 0.1 level, possibly indicating a pacifying effect from 
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non-empirical. Because the interaction pattern has already been established for the overall sample, in discussing the 
patterns on subsamples the focus rests on how the shape of the interaction changes, and less on the level of 
significance. An interaction on a subset that is consistent with the qualitative pattern on the entire sample is credible 
even if non-significant, since the non-significance may be attributed to the reduced sample size. 
The challenge posed by youth bulges is most pronounced in Sub-Saharan Africa, where large youth 
populations will continue to be a dominating demographic characteristic of the region for decades. In Model 10, we 
run the basic model with the interaction term for the sub-sample consisting of the 29 Sub-Sahara African countries 
covered by the education dataset. The results on the whole confirm the pattern above: the interaction of large youth 
cohorts and low secondary education is positively associated with conflict, but not statistically significant. However, 
in Model 11, we run the model again for a larger sub-sample of all low and middle-income countries, defined as 
those countries with a real GDP per capita (adjusted for purchasing power parities) of less than USD 10,000 (1996 
as base year). In this segment, the interaction of large youth bulges and low education is positive and clearly 
statistically significant. This general finding of a relationship in the low and middle income segment has particular 
relevance for Sub-Saharan Africa, which is the continent with the largest youth cohorts and the lowest levels of male 
secondary education, scoring on average nearly 30 percentage points lower than the world average. 
 
Figure 6 Response on SSA subsample  
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Figure 7 Response on Low-to-Mid-Income subsample 
 
 
Qualitative changes can only be observed in two cases. Youth bulges have a stronger effect on conflict in countries 
with low economic opportunities (Model 12, Figure 8), defined here as a high share of income from the agricultural 
sector
10, but there is no significant effect of the interaction between education and youth.  
 
                                                           
10 Data collected from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators(World Bank, 2003). We have used an 
alternative measure, Foreign Direct Investment as share of total GDP, also producing insignificant results. Breaking the Waves? Education, Youth Bulges, and Armed Conflict 
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Weinstein (2005) suggests that rebel organizations with access to rich natural resources are able to grow faster by 
recruiting low-cost rebels using resource rents. Our data suggest that in the stratum of countries with high levels of 
primary commodity exports
11 (Model 13, Figure 9), youth bulge effects are not detectable, and there is no 
discernable interaction effect between youth and low education.  
                                                           
11 Data from Fearon & Laitin (2003), we have also used an alternative measure of natural resource rents from de 
Soysa & Neumayer (2007).  Breaking the Waves? Education, Youth Bulges, and Armed Conflict 
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Figure 9 Response on resource-dependent subsample 
 
 
These last two results, regarding the possible presence of youth effects but no education interaction in countries with 
large agricultural sectors, and the absence of either in resource-dependent countries, lends credence to the notion 
that the effect of education and youth on conflict risk is mediated by structural economic factors. This is confirmed 
further by the fact that those stratifications that confirmed the qualitative shape of the education-youth-conflict 
interaction found on the overall sample, related either to non-economic factors, or, in the case of low-to-mid-income 
countries, to the size rather than the structural characteristics of the economy. 
  The inability of education to reduce the contribution of large youth cohorts to conflict risk in highly 
agricultural societies may indicate that it is the ability to participate in the modern sector that is risk-reducing, rather 
than education as such. The result in resource-rich economies is more difficult to interpret, but may indicate that 
access to rich natural resources allows rebel organizations to recruit successfully even in a ‘competitive’ market 
where the pool of potential recruits is relatively small and regular livelihood alternatives exist for the more educated. 
 
 
5.0 Conclusion and further research 
The present analysis is constrained on several fronts. Some of the most conflict-affected countries of the last few 
decades are not included in the IIASA data and therefore absent from the combined dataset. The real-life 
interactions between education and the other variables are likely to be highly complex, and there is little theory to 
suggest their functional form. The education data itself is relatively coarse: even the secondary education data is 
somewhat ‘noisy’ as a result of estimates of the age of transition. Another constraint is that we are measuring 
quantity of education rather than quality. In certain cases this may misrepresent the relevance of education for the Breaking the Waves? Education, Youth Bulges, and Armed Conflict 
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opportunities of young people (e.g. Salehi-Isfahani & Dhillon, 2008: 14). Finally, the outcome measure, while 
standard, captures only one specific aspect of national conflict. Measures of political unrest might in principle 
produce stronger results, but are of questionable reliability. 
Given all these constraints, the stronger age structure effect in the context of low education is surprisingly 
clear-cut. It indicates that the connection is real and robust. By itself, this result does not conclusively prove that the 
connection is causal. Even though the level of the specific education variable used here is determined at an earlier 
point in time than the conflict outcome is measured, it may be the case that both youth education and conflict risk 
are determined by an even earlier shared cause, but with different lags. 
Nevertheless, the results of this study are particularly interesting in that they are easier to explain with 
reference to some hypotheses concerning the effect of youth education on conflict than with reference to others. The 
fact that in low youth education contexts there is a strong age structure effect, and particularly so in low and middle 
income countries, supports an argument based on opportunity costs, namely that the incentive to participate in 
violent conflict is lower for more highly educated youths. These results support Hypotheses 1 and 2, while 
Hypothesis 3 relating the risk of youth and low education in particular to countries’ dependence on income from 
primary commodity exports is unsupported. Similarly, there does not appear to be an interaction effect in countries 
with large agricultural sectors. A different theoretical argument, namely that expanding cohorts of relatively well 
educated youth are more easily frustrated by lack of opportunities for either further education or jobs, formulated in 
Hypotheses 4 and 5, is not supported by the present analysis. In this context it is worth re-emphasizing that the 
dependent variable here is a criterion of deaths due to political violence. It might well be that great expansions in the 
number of university students are a greater risk factor for political unrest short of mass violence; the present analysis 
merely suggests they do not increase the risk of fatal organized political violence.  
A caveat is required here. Strictly speaking, the conclusion that it is large numbers of under-educated male 
youths that increase the risk of conflict is unwarranted and represents an instance of the ‘ecological fallacy’. The 
statistical results do not exclude the possibility that in the low education contexts it is in fact the few highly educated 
individuals that contribute to conflict. While consistent with the numbers, this alternative interpretation seems 
implausible from a theoretical point of view. It is also not supported by recent micro-level studies by Brett & Specht 
(2004), Humphreys (2005) and Oyefusi (2008), suggesting that low education increases the propensity to recruit as 
rebels. Our results also suggest that increasing educational levels for females may have an indirect pacifying effect. 
Nevertheless this study can only be a first step in improving our understanding of the link between 
education, demography and conflict. Further research is required. The most obvious next step is to include a greater 
number of countries/territories and increase coverage in time. The IIASA backprojection methodology cannot 
robustly be extended further back than 1970, but data for the period 2000-2005, and for additional countries, should 
become available in the near future. In terms of testing the opportunity cost argument further, the single most useful 
piece of information would be youth unemployment figures for different levels of education. These are already 
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Appendix A Temporal-spatial coverage of the education data: 
 
120 existing countries 
4 historical entities 
Total: 124 






Name  ID number  Observations  Start  End 
         
Americas (24)         
United States of America  2 31 1970 2000
Canada  20 31 1970 2000
Bahamas  31 31 1970 2000
Cuba  40 31 1970 2000
Haiti  41 31 1970 2000
Dominican Republic  42 31 1970 2000
Mexico  70 31 1970 2000
Belize  80 31 1970 2000
Guatemala  90 31 1970 2000
Honduras  91 31 1970 2000
El Salvador  92 31 1970 2000
Nicaragua  93 31 1970 2000
Costa Rica  94 31 1970 2000
Panama  95 31 1970 2000
Colombia  100 31 1970 2000
Guyana  110 31 1970 2000
Ecuador  130 31 1970 2000
Peru  135 31 1970 2000
Brazil  140 31 1970 2000
Bolivia  145 31 1970 2000
Paraguay  150 31 1970 2000
Chile  155 31 1970 2000
Argentina  160 31 1970 2000
Uruguay  165 31 1970 2000
       
Europe (37)      
United Kingdom  200 31 1970 2000
Ireland  205 31 1970 2000Breaking the Waves? Education, Youth Bulges, and Armed Conflict 
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Netherlands  210 31 1970 2000
Belgium  211 31 1970 2000
Luxemburg  212 31 1970 2000
France  220 31 1970 2000
Switzerland  225 31 1970 2000
Spain  230 31 1970 2000
Portugal  235 31 1970 2000
Germany  255 10 1991 2000
German Federal Republic  260 21 1970 1990
German Democratic Republic  265 21 1970 1990
Poland  290 31 1970 2000
Austria  305 31 1970 2000
Hungary  310 31 1970 2000
Czechoslovakia  315 23 1970 1992
Czech Republic  316 8 1993 2000
Slovakia  317 8 1993 2000
Italy  325 31 1970 2000
Malta  338 31 1970 2000
Macedonia  343 8 1993 2000
Croatia  344 9 1992 2000
Slovenia  349 9 1992 2000
Greece  350 31 1970 2000
Cyprus  352 31 1970 2000
Bulgaria  355 31 1970 2000
Rumania  360 31 1970 2000
Russia (Soviet Union 1970-91)  365 31 1970 2000
Estonia  366 9 1992 2000
Latvia  367 9 1992 2000
Lithuania  368 9 1992 2000
Ukraine  369 9 1992 2000
Armenia  371 9 1992 2000
Finland  375 31 1970 2000
Sweden  380 31 1970 2000
Norway  385 31 1970 2000
Denmark  390 31 1970 2000
       
Sub-Saharan Africa (29)      
Mali  432 31 1970 2000
Benin  434 31 1970 2000
Mauritania  435 31 1970 2000
Niger  436 31 1970 2000Breaking the Waves? Education, Youth Bulges, and Armed Conflict 
33 
Ivory Coast  437 31 1970 2000
Guinea  438 31 1970 2000
Burkina Faso  439 31 1970 2000
Ghana  452 31 1970 2000
Togo  461 31 1970 2000
Cameroun  471 31 1970 2000
Nigeria  475 31 1970 2000
Gabon  481 31 1970 2000
Central African Republic  482 31 1970 2000
Chad  483 31 1970 2000
Uganda  500 31 1970 2000
Kenya  501 31 1970 2000
Tanzania  510 31 1970 2000
Rwanda  517 31 1970 2000
Ethiopia  530 31 1970 2000
Eritrea  531 8 1993 2000
Mozambique  541 31 1970 2000
Zambia  551 31 1970 2000
Zimbabwe  552 31 1970 2000
Malawi  553 31 1970 2000
South Africa  560 31 1970 2000
Namibia  565 31 1970 2000
Malagasy Republic  580 31 1970 2000
Comoros  581 31 1970 2000
Mauritius  590 31 1970 2000
       
Middle East/North Africa (8)      
Morocco  600 31 1970 2000
Iran  630 31 1970 2000
Turkey  640 31 1970 2000
Egypt  651 31 1970 2000
Syria  652 31 1970 2000
Jordan  663 31 1970 2000
Saudi Arabia  670 31 1970 2000
Bahrain  692 31 1970 2000
       
Asia (24)      
Turkmenistan  701 9 1992 2000
Kyrgyz Republic  703 9 1992 2000
Uzbekistan  704 9 1992 2000
Kazakhstan  705 9 1992 2000Breaking the Waves? Education, Youth Bulges, and Armed Conflict 
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China  710 31 1970 2000
Mongolia  712 31 1970 2000
Korea,South  732 31 1970 2000
Japan  740 31 1970 2000
India  750 31 1970 2000
Pakistan  770 31 1970 2000
Bangladesh  771 29 1972 2000
Sri Lanka  780 31 1970 2000
Maldive Islands  781 31 1970 2000
Nepal  790 31 1970 2000
Thailand  800 31 1970 2000
Cambodia  811 31 1970 2000
Vietnam, Dem. Rep. Of  816 31 1970 2000
Vietnam, Republic of  817 6 1970 1975
Malaysia  820 31 1970 2000
Singapore  830 31 1970 2000
Philippines  840 31 1970 2000
Indonesia  850 31 1970 2000
Macau  1320 31 1970 2000
Hong Kong  1330 31 1970 2000
       
Oceania (2)      
Australia  900 31 1970 2000
New Zealand  920 31 1970 2000
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Appendix B: Educational attainment by level and gender, Sub-Saharan Africa, Year 2000 
 














Benin  74.1 47.0 34.3 14.3  20.0
Burkina Faso  42.1 31.8 20.8 12.6  8.3
Cameroun  93.7 85.2 55.2 43.9  11.3
Central African Rep.  86.0 64.6 36.8 22.1  14.7
Chad  69.7 40.5 29.1 8.0  21.1
Eritrea  87.7 78.5 48.1 27.9  20.2
Ethiopia  31.8 25.8 20.2 13.8  6.3
Gabon  98.3 96.6 71.4 62.7  8.7
Ghana  90.7 85.3 73.3 60.8  12.5
Guinea  55.9 31.2 32.1 12.5  19.6
Ivory Coast  65.7 50.2 31.9 20.4  11.5
Kenya  94.3 92.2 39.0 32.8  6.2
Malagasy Republic  80.6 79.4 30.6 30.9  -0.3
Malawi  87.7 81.3 27.5 13.4  14.1
Mali  40.8 27.2 21.5 10.2  11.3
Mauritania  68.4 65.9 32.3 19.6  12.7
Mozambique  89.2 76.0 26.9 11.1  15.8
Namibia  100.0 100.0 24.3 25.8  -1.5
Niger  40.0 21.2 18.3 7.7  10.6
Nigeria  84.5 69.6 63.3 48.0  15.3
Rwanda  85.1 85.4 16.1 14.6  1.5
South Africa  97.0 96.9 62.1 66.3  -4.2
Tanzania  80.7 76.0 10.5 7.7  2.8
Togo  89.1 69.9 48.8 20.8  28.0
Uganda  96.8 90.1 31.0 21.0  10.1
Zambia  93.7 91.1 47.0 35.1  11.9
Zimbabwe  98.7 98.0 72.6 67.2  5.4
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Appendix C: Sub-Sahara African Countries Ranked by Percentage of Males Aged 15-19 with at Least 
Primary Education, Year 2000 
 





Burkina Faso  42.1
Guinea  55.9
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Appendix D: Sub-Sahara African Countries Ranked by Percentage of Males Aged 20-24 with at Least 
Secondary Education, Year 2000 
 
Country 












Malagasy Republic  30.6
Uganda  31.0
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Appendix E Alternative stratifications of Model 9 







Medium secondary education dummy                β 
                                                                           Z 








Medium IMR  0. 913 
 (0.52) 
   
High IMR  0.132 
(0.13) 
   
Very high IMR  1.581 
(1.39) 
   
% male secondary attainment  -1.031 
(-1.26) 
   





Ethnic polarization      0.440 
(0.62) 
Religious polarization      -0.863 
(-1.57) 
Resource dependence      0.949 
(0.71) 
Agricultural share of GDP      0.025
* 
(1.93) 
Urban growth      -0.134 
(-1.22) 






































Youth*Low IMR  -6.374 
(-0.80) 
   
Youth*Medium IMR  -0.500 
(-0.12) 
   
Youth*High IMR  18.049
** 
(2.21) 
   
Youth*Very high IMR  -11.196 
(-0.73) 
   






































***p<0.01. Robust z statistics in parentheses. 